Relay-Version: B 2.11 6/12/87; site viscous Path: attctc!texbell!sequoia!execu!cs.utexas.edu!usc!apple!geoff From: geoff@Apple.COM (Geoff Peck) Newsgroups: rec.aviation Subject: Pilot Judgement Message-ID: <36526@apple.Apple.COM> Date: Wed, 15 Nov 89 17:02:24 PST Organization: Apple Computer Inc., Cupertino, CA Lines: 367 A hearty thanks to Steve Shellans for recounting his recent learning experience in article <5043@tekcrl.LABS.TEK.COM>, and, indeed, to all the net-pilots who have recounted their own learning experiences. There are really two primary ways a pilot can learn: by experiencing something first-hand, or by listening to the experiences of others. Only after such input can a pilot make adjustments to his or her own behavior pattern: for example, either to decide to do such things again, or to decide to NOT do such things again. In the most recent _FAA_Aviation_News_ (September-October, 1989), there's a rather long article which is quite relevant to this discussion. I've reproduced it below. (Thank goodness for scanners.) (Government publications such as this one are not copyright, BTW.) You might want to print it out and spend some time with it. If you've got comments, by all means post 'em, or if you prefer, direct e-mail to me is of course welcome. (You can also let me know about typos, er, scannos.) Geoff ----- Geoff Peck, Apple Computer, Inc., MS60-E, Cupertino, CA 95014 (408) 974-3184 geoff@apple.com {sun,nsc}!apple!geoff AppleLink: PECK.G #include ----- Antidotes for Negative Attitudes How to Avoid Poor Flight Decisions Based on Entrenched Thought Patterns Editor's Note: This article was adapted from the publication, "Aeronautical Decision Making -- Student and Private Pilots" (report number FAA/PM-86/41), with the assistance of Jeff Roy, Accident Prevention Coordinator for the New England Region. For every flight maneuver, there is an appropriate aircraft attitude, as we all know. For every flight situation, there is an appropriate pilot attitude, which also affects flight safety. However, some pilots have fixed attitudes, which trigger automatic responses that may be very inappropriate and lead to decisions that are unsafe. Such fixed attitudes are often based on an underlying fear. For example, a pilot who realizes he will be landing far beyond the normal touchdown point may not go around simply because he is afraid someone may see what he is doing and consider him an unskilled pilot. Similarly, a pilot might habitually prefer to go ahead with a flight when the weather is marginal, in order to suppress some inner doubts about has ability to handle instrument conditions. Pilots who habitually disregard established safety practices may be responding to an inner fear about losing their independence. On the other hand, pilots who fail to respond to a situation that requires individual initiative may fear being blamed if their efforts turn out to be unsuccessful. The "Judgement Training Manual", a study undertaken by FAA, Transport Canada, and the General Aviation Manufacturer's Association, concluded that there are five principal hazardous thought patterns, or attitudes, which are of special concern to pilots. To some extent, most of us are influenced occasionally by these kinds of automatic thought patterns, usually without being aware of themQperhaps because the patterns were formed in early life as a protection against apprehensive feelings. As pilots, these attitudes can cause us and others serious harm. In order to free ourselves from their domination, we need to be able to recognize their presence. Discovering Your Own Weaknesses The first step toward deactivating these negative mind sets is to discover which of the common five hazardous thought patterns tend to influence our decisions. The following questions are part of a Self-Assessment Profile developed for the Judgement Training Manual cited above. Ten "SITUATIONS" are presented, each with five possible reasons for the decision taken by the pilot. DIRECTIONS: Read the scenarios that follow. Opposite each SITUATION on the Answer sheet, check off the space under the reason identifier letter (a, b, c, d, or e) which corresponds most nearly to the reason you, as PIC, would given for deciding what to do. Even though you may feel that you would not ordinarily have made some, or any, of the PIC decisions given, assume that you did so. SITUATION 1: You are forty minutes late for a trip in a small airplane, and since the aircraft handled well on the previous day's flight, you decide to skip most of the preflight check. What leads you to this decision? a. If any problems develop, the responsibility would not be yours. It is the maintenance of the airplane that really makes a difference. b. You feel that your reputation for being on time demands that you cut corners when necessary. c. You see no reason to think that something unfortunate will d. You simply take the first approach for making up time that comes to mind. e. You believe that some of the preflight inspection is just a waste of time. SITUATION 2: You are about to fly an aircraft which you know is old and has been poorly maintained. A higher than normal RPM drop on the magneto check is indicated, and you suspect the spark plugs. However, your friends, who are traveling as passengers, do not want to be delayed. After five minutes of debate, you agree to make the trip. Why do you permit yourself to be persuaded? a. You feel that your opinion may be wrong since none of the passengers seem to feel there is any risk. b. You feel that it is important to prove your ability as a great pilot, even under less than ideal circumstances. c. You think that the spark plugs will certainly last for just one more flight. d. The thought of changing all the flight and travel arrangements is too annoying. So you jump at the suggestion of the passengers. e. You believe that regulations over-stress safety in this kind of situation. SITUATION 3: You are on final approach, when you notice a large unidentified object on the far end of the runway. You consider going around, but your friend suggests landing anyway since the runway is "plenty long enough". You land, stopping barely 25 ft. short of the obstacle. Why did you agree to land? a. You are pleased to have someone else help with the decision and decide your friend is right. b. You want to show your friend that you can stop any airplane as quickly as needed. c. You have never had an accident, so you feel that nothing will happen this time. d. You do not have much time, so you just go ahead and act on your friend's suggestion. e. You feel that the FAA regulations making the pilot responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft do not apply here since it is the airport's responsibility to maintain the runway. SITUATION 4: You have just completed your base leg for a landing on runway 15 at an uncontrolled airport. As you turn on final, you see that the wind has changed, blowing from about 90 degrees. You make two sharp turns and land on runway 11. What was your reasoning? a. The unexpected wind change is a bad break, but you figure if the wind can change, so can you. b. You believe that a really good pilot can safely make sudden maneuvers. c. You know there would be no danger in making the sudden turns because you do things like this all the time and never had a problem. d. You know landing into the wind is best, so you act as soon as you can to avoid a crosswind landing. e. You believe your flight instructor was overly cautious in insisting that a pilot must go around rather than make sudden course changes while final landing. SITUATION 5: You have flown to your destination airfield only in daylight but believe that you know it well. You learn that your airplane needs a minor repair which will delay your arrival until well after dark. Although a good portion of the flight will be after dark, you feel that you should be able to recognize some of the lighted landmarks. Why did you decide to make the flight? a. You believe that when your time comes you cannot escape, and until that time there is no need to worry. b. You feel that if anyone can handle this problem, you can do it. c. You simply do not believe that you could get off course despite your unfamiliarity with ground references at night. d. You do not want to wait to study other options, so you carry out your first plan. e. You believe that the repair is not necessary. You decide you will not let recommended, but minor, maintenance stop you from getting to your destination as planned. SITUATION 6: You are on a flight to an unfamiliar, rural airport. Flight service states that VFR flight is not recommended since heavy coastal fog is forecast to move into the destination airport area about the time you expect to land. You first consider returning to your home base where visibility is still good but decide instead to continue as planned and land safely after some problems. Why did you reach this decision? a. You reason that since your actions would make no real difference, you might as well continue. b. You hate to admit that you cannot complete your original flight plan. c. You feel sure that things will turn out safely that there is not danger. d. You feel the need to decide quickly so you take the simplest alternative. e. You resent the suggestion by flight service that you should change your mind. SITUATION 7: While taxiing for takeoff, you notice that your right brake pedal is softer than the left. Once airborne, you are sufficiently concerned about the problem to radio for information. Since strong winds are reported at your destination, an experienced pilot who is a passenger recommends that you abandon the flight and return to your departure airport. You choose to continue the flight and experience no further difficulties. Why did you continue? a. You feel that you can leave the decision to the tower at your destination. b. You are sure that if anyone could handle the landing, you can. c. Your brakes have never failed before, so you doubt that they will this time. d. You immediately decide that you want to continue. e. You feel that suggestion made in this type of situation are usually overly cautious. SITUATION 8: Your regular airplane has been grounded because of an airframe problem. You are scheduled in another airplane and discover it is a model you are not familiar with. After your pre flight you decide to takeoff on your business trip as planned. What was your reasoning? a. You tell yourself that if there were any danger, you would not have been offered the plane. b. You are in a hurry and do not want to take the time to think of alternate choices. c. You feel that a difficult situation will not arise so there is no reason not to go. d. You are in a hurry and do not want to take the time to think of alternate choices. e. You are convinced that your flight instructor was much too conservative and pessimistic when he cautioned you to be thoroughly checked out in an unfamiliar aircraft. SITUATION 9: You were briefed about possible icing conditions but did not think there would be any problem since your departure airport temperature was 60 degrees F. As you near your destination, you encounter freezing precipitation, which clings to your aircraft. Your passenger, who is a more experienced pilot, begins to panic. You consider turning back to the departure airport but continue instead. Why did you not return? a. You feel that having come this far, things are out of your hands. b. You do not want the passenger to think you are afraid. c. You do not believe that the icing could cause your plane to crash in these circumstances. d. The panic of the passenger makes you "commit yourself" without thinking the situation over. e. You are determined not to let the passenger think he can influence what you do. SITUATION 10: You do not bother to check weather conditions a your destination. En route, you encounter headwinds. Your fuel supply is adequate to reach your destination, but there is almost no reserve for emergencies. You continue the flight and land with a nearly dry tank. What most influenced you to do this? a. You reason that the situation has already been determined because the destination is closer than any other airport. b. You do not want your friends to hear that you had to turn back. c. You believe that all things usually turn out well, and this will be no exception. d. Being unhappy with the pressure of having to choose what to do, you make a snap decision. e. You feel that flight manuals always understate the safety margin in fuel tank capacity. TAKING SCORE: Now that you have made your selections, total the number of checks in each column. The column with the most checks indicates your predominant pattern of attitudinal thinking. The following discussion explains the types of thoughts that are associated with each letter group. What Lies Behind the Attitudes Group a. Resignation. If more of your checks were in Column a than in any of the other columns, you have a tendency to avoid making difficult choices or accepting responsibility. People who resign themselves ("What's the Use?") to the apparently inevitable, do not see themselves as making a great deal of difference in what happens to them. When things go well, they think, "That's good luck." When things go badly, they attribute it to bad luck or feel that someone is "out to get them." They leave the action to othersQfor better or worse. Sometimes such individuals will even go along with unreasonable or unsafe requests just to be a "Nice Guy." They may abdicate their PIC authority rather than risk taking an unpopular or unorthodox course of action. Group b. Macho. People who are always or often trying to prove that they are better than anyone else think, "I can do it if anyone can!" They must always "prove" themselves by taking risks and by trying to impress others. While this pattern is thought to be a male characteristic, women are equally susceptible. Group c. Invulnerability. Many people feel that accidents happen to others but never to them. They know accidents can happen, and they know that anyone can be affected; but they never really feel or believe that they will be the one involved. Pilots who think this way are more likely to take chances and run unwise risks, thinking all the time, "It won't happen to me!" They secretly believe they have a guardian angel. Group d. Impulsiveness. This is the thought pattern of people who frequently feel the need to "Do something -- quickly!" Anything, immediately. They do not stop to think about what they are about to do; there is never time to select the best alternativeQthey just do the first thing that comes to mind. Group e. Anti-Authority. This thought is found in people who do not like anyone telling them what to do. They think, "Don't tell me!" In a sense, they are saying, "I'm not a kid. No one can tell me what to do." Such pilots may either be resentful of having someone tell them what to do or may just regard rules, regulations, and procedures as silly or unnecessary. They may have had a very rigid education or upbringing. It is always a pilot's prerogative to question authority when it appears to be in error, but an anti-authority attitude is something else. This inventory does not say that you are bound to act in accordance with one or more of these hazardous thoughts, but that you have a tendency to do so. Having thoughts generated by strong feelings is common and normal, but feeling obliged to act on them can lead to an accident. A critical part of your development and training as a pilot is to learn to recognize, in order to control, hazardous attitudes. SUGGESTION: On a blank sheet of paper, list the five negative attitudes in a column in declining order of your susceptibility to them. Devise an appropriate positive attitude, or "antidote," like the ones listed below. Negative Attitude Antidote ----------------- -------- Anti-Authority Someone is trying to help me. (Don't tell me what to do.) The rules are based on a lot more experience than I have. Impulsive Is there something I don't want to (I have to do something quickly) know, or see? What is the hurry, really? Invulnerability Am I really Superman? Fantasies (It won't happen to me) can be dangerous. Macho Dead pilots are not pilots. (I can do anything with an airplane) Resignation By thinking, I can make a difference. (What's the use?) How would I feel if I were on board the DC-10 that lost all hydraulic controls over Iowa, and the captain had announced, "Sorry, folks. Nothing I can do." -- Geoff Peck, Apple Computer, Inc., MS60-E, Cupertino, CA 95014 (408) 974-3184 geoff@apple.com {sun,nsc}!apple!geoff AppleLink: PECK.G #include